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Nuclear proliferation is the spread from nation to nation of nuclear technology, including nuclear power plants but especially nuclear weapons.
The primary focus of anti-proliferation efforts is to maintain control over the specialized materials necessary to build such
devices because, this is the most difficult and expensive part of a nuclear weapons programme. (In the Manhattan Project, 90% of the budget was dedicated to isotope separation and enrichment.) The main materials whose generation
and distribution is controlled are highly enriched uranium and
plutonium. The scientific and technical means for weapons development, although
non-trivial, are generally available in order to develop rudimentary, but working nuclear devices. (The Nth Country Experiment is an excellent example of this.)
The International Atomic Energy
Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 has
been an international success. It has involved cooperation in developing nuclear energy while ensuring that civil uranium, plutonium and associated plants are
used only for peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation or nuclear weapons programmes. In 1995 the NPT was extended indefinitely.
Most countries have renounced nuclear weapons, recognising that possession of them would threaten rather than enhance national
security. They have therefore embraced the NPT as a public commitment to use nuclear materials and technology only for peaceful
purposes.
The NPT Origins And Objectives
At present, 187 states are party to the NPT. These include all five declared Nuclear Weapons States (NWSs): the People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the UK, and the USA.
Notable non-signatories to the NPT are Israel, Pakistan, and India. North
Korea was once a signatory but withdrew in the late 1990's.
The NPT's main objectives are to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons, to provide security for non-nuclear weapon states
which have given up the nuclear option, to encourage international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to pursue negotiations in good faith towards nuclear
disarmament leading to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.
The IAEA was set up by unanimous resolution of the United Nations in
1957 to help nations develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Allied to this role is
the administration of safeguards arrangements to provide assurance to the international community that individual countries are
honouring their commitments under the treaty.
The IAEA regularly inspects of civil nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation supplied to it. The agency
checks inventories, and samples and analyzes materials. Safeguards are designed to deter diversion of nuclear material by
increasing the risk of early detection. They are complemented by controls on the export of sensitive technology from countries
such as UK and USA through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The main concern of the IAEA is that uranium not be enriched beyond what
is necessary for commercial civil plants, and that plutonium which is produced by
nuclear reactors not be refined into a form that would be suitable
for bomb production.
Scope of safeguards
Traditional safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key
element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes.
Parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguard measures applied by the IAEA. These require that operators of nuclear
facilities maintain and declare detailed accounting records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear material. Over
550 facilities and several hundred other locations are subject to regular inspection, and their records and the nuclear material
being audited. Inspections by the IAEA are complemented by other measures such as surveillance cameras and instrumentation.
The inspections act as an alert system providing a warning of the possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceful
activities. The system relies on;
- Material Accountability - tracking all inward and outward transfers and the flow of materials in any nuclear facility. This
includes sampling and analysis of nuclear material, on-site inspections, and review and verification of operating records.
- Physical Security - restricting access to nuclear materials at the site.
- Containment and Surveillance - use of seals, automatic cameras and other instruments to detect unreported movement or
tampering with nuclear materials, as well as spot checks on-site.
All NPT non-weapons states must accept these full-scope safeguards. In the five weapons states plus the non-NPT states
(India, Pakistan and Israel), facility-specific safeguards apply. IAEA inspectors regularly visit these facilities to verify
completeness and accuracy of records.
The terms of the NPT cannot be enforced by the IAEA itself, nor can nations be forced to sign the treaty. In reality, as shown
in Iraq and North Korea, safeguards can
be backed up by diplomatic, political and economic measures.
While traditional safeguards easily verified the correctness of formal declarations by suspect states, in the 1990s attention turned to what might not have been declared. While accepting safeguards at
declared facilities, Iraq had set up elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium to weapons grade. North Korea
attempted to use research reactors (not commercial electricity-generating reactors) and a reprocessing plant to produce some
weapons-grade plutonium.
The weakness of the NPT regime lay in the fact that no obvious diversion of material was involved. The uranium used as fuel
probably came from indigenous sources, and the nuclear facilities were built by the countries themselves without being declared
or placed under safeguards. Iraq, as an NPT party, was obliged to declare all facilities but did not do so. In North Korea, the
activities concerned took place before the conclusion of its NPT safeguards agreement.
Nevertheless, the activities were detected and brought under control using international diplomacy. In Iraq, a military defeat
assisted this process. With North Korea, the promised provision of commercial power reactors eventually helped resolve the
situation.
Undeclared nuclear activities
In 1993 a programme was initiated to strengthen and extend the classical safeguards
system, and a model protocol was agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors in 1997. The
measures boosted the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the civil fuel
cycle.
Innovations were of two kinds. Some could be implemented on the basis of IAEA's existing legal authority through safeguards
agreements and inspections. Others required further legal authority to be conferred through an Additional Protocol. This must be
agreed by each non-weapons state with IAEA, as a supplement to any existing comprehensive safeguards agreement. Weapons states
have agreed to accept the principles of the model additional protocol.
Key elements of the model Additional Protocol:
- The IAEA is to be given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including R & D,
production of uranium and thorium (regardless of whether it is traded), and
nuclear-related imports and exports.
- IAEA inspectors will have greater rights of access. This will include any suspect location, it can be at short notice (e.g.,
two hours), and the IAEA can deploy environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities.
- States must streamline administrative procedures so that IAEA inspectors get automatic visa renewal and can communicate more
readily with IAEA headquarters.
- Further evolution of safeguards is towards evaluation of each state, taking account of its particular situation and the kind
of nuclear materials it has. This will involve greater judgement on the part of IAEA and the development of effective
methodologies which reassure NPT States.
Currently 54 states have signed and 18 have ratified the Additional Protocol.
The greatest risk of nuclear weapons proliferation lies with countries which have not joined the NPT and which have
significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities. India, Pakistan and Israel are in this category. While safeguards apply to some of
their activities, others remain beyond scrutiny.
Other IAEA developments
In May 1995, NPT parties reaffirmed their commitment to a Fissile Materials Cut-off
Treaty to prohibit the production of any further fissile material for weapons. This aims to complement the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996 and to codify commitments made by USA, UK, France and Russia to cease production of weapons
material, as well as putting a similar ban on China. This treaty will also put more pressure on Israel, India and Pakistan to
agree to international verification.
Additional arrangements
Implementation of IAEA safeguards in the 13 non-nuclear weapon states of the |EU is governed by a Verification Agreement between the country concerned, EURATOM, and the IAEA. Safeguards activities are carried out jointly by the IAEA and EURATOM. A revision to earlier
arrangements, the New Partnership Approach (NPA), was agreed in April 1992. The NPA enables
the IAEA itself to deploy more of its resources in member states where independent regional safeguards systems are not in
place.
Shortly after entry into force of the NPT, multilateral consultations on nuclear export controls led to the establishment of
two separate mechanisms for dealing with nuclear exports: the Zangger
Committee in 1971 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1975.
The Zangger Committee, also known as the Non Proliferation Treaty Exporters Committee, was set up to consider how procedures
for exports of nuclear material and equipment related to NPT commitments. In August 1974
the committee produced a trigger list of items which would require the application of IAEA safeguards if exported to a non
Nuclear Weapons State which was not party to the NPT. The trigger list is regularly updated. The Zangger Committee now has 31
member states.
The NSG, originally known as the London Group or London Suppliers Group, was set up in 1974 after India exploded its first
nuclear device. The main reason for the group's formation was to bring in France, a major nuclear supplier nation which was not
then party to the NPT. It included both members and non-members of the Zangger Committee. The group communicated its guidelines,
essentially a set of export rules, to the IAEA in 1978. These were to ensure that transfers
of nuclear material or equipment would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, and
formal government assurances to this effect were required from recipients. The Guidelines also recognised the need for physical
protection measures in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials, and strengthened retransfer
provisions. The NSG began with seven members -- the USA, the former
USSR, the UK, France, Germany, Canada and Japan -- but now includes 35 countries.
Additional Discussion of Unsanctioned Activity
Up to the late 1980s it was generally assumed that any undeclared nuclear activities
would have to be based on the diversion of nuclear material from safeguards. States acknowledged the possibility of nuclear
activities entirely separate from those covered by safeguards, but it was assumed they would be detected by national intelligence
activities. There was no particular effort by IAEA to attempt to detect them.
Iraq had been making efforts to secure a nuclear potential since the 1960s. In the late 1970s a specialised plant, Osiraq, was constructed near Baghdad. The plant was attacked during the Iran-Iraq War and was destroyed in a pre-emptive strike by Israeli bombers in
June 1981.
Not until the 1990 NPT Review Conference did some states raise the possibility of making
more use of (for example) provisions for "special inspections" in existing NPT Safeguards Agreements. Special inspections can be
undertaken at locations other than those where safeguards routinely apply, if there is reason to believe there may be undeclared
material or activities.
After inspections in Iraq following the UN Gulf War cease-fire resolution showed
the extent of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme, it became clear that the IAEA would have to broaden the scope of its
activities. Iraq was an NPT Party, and had thus agreed to place all its nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. But the
inspections revealed that it had been pursuing an extensive clandestine uranium enrichment programme, as well as a nuclear
weapons design programme.
The main thrust of Iraq's uranium enrichment programme was the development of technology for electromagnetic isotope separation
(EMIS) of indigenous uranium. This uses the same principles as a mass
spectrometer (albeit on a much larger scale). Ions of uranium-238 and uranium-235 are separated because they describe arcs of
different radii when they move through a magnetic field. This process was used in the Manhattan Project to make the highly enriched uranium used in the Hiroshima bomb, but was abandoned soon afterwards.
The Iraqis did the basic research work at their nuclear research establishment at Tuwaitha, near Baghdad, and were building two full-scale facilities at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat, north of Baghdad. However,
when the war broke out, only a few separators had been installed at Tarmiya, and none at Ash Sharqat.
The Iraqis were also very interested in centrifuge
enrichment, and had been able to acquire some components including some carbon-fibre rotors, which they were at an early
stage of testing.
They were clearly in violation of their NPT and safeguards obligations, and the IAEA Board of Governors ruled to that effect.
The UN Security Council then ordered the IAEA to remove,
destroy or render harmless Iraq's nuclear weapons capability. This was done by mid 1998,
but Iraq then ceased all cooperation with the UN, so the IAEA withdrew from this work.
The revelations from Iraq provided the impetus for a very far-reaching reconsideration of what safeguards are intended to
achieve.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) acceded to the NPT in 1985 as a
condition for the supply of a nuclear power station by the USSR. However, it delayed
concluding its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, a process which should take only 18 months, until April 1992.
During that period, it brought into operation a small gas-cooled, graphite-moderated, natural-uranium (metal) fuelled
"Experimental Power Reactor" of about 25 MWt. It exhibited all the features of a plutonium
production reactor for weapons purposes and produced only about 5 MWe. North Korea also made
substantial progress in the construction of two larger reactors designed on the same principles, a prototype of about 200 MWt (50
MWe), and a full-scale version of about 800 MWt (200 MWe).
In addition it completed and commissioned a reprocessing plant for the extraction of plutonium from spent reactor fuel. That
plutonium, if the fuel was only irradiated to a very low burn-up, would have been in a form very suitable for weapons. Although
all these facilities at Yongbyon were to be under safeguards, there was always the
risk that at some stage, the DPRK would withdraw from the NPT and use the plutonium for weapons.
One of the first steps in applying NPT safeguards is for the IAEA to verify the initial stocks of uranium and plutonium to
ensure that all the nuclear material in the country have been declared for safeguards purposes. While undertaking this work in
1992, IAEA inspectors found discrepancies which indicated that the reprocessing plant had
been used more often than the DPRK had declared, which suggested that the DPRK could have weapons-grade plutonium which it had
not declared to the IAEA. Information passed to the IAEA by a Member State (as required by the IAEA) supported that suggestion by
indicating that the DPRK had two undeclared waste or other storage sites.
In February 1993 the IAEA called on the DPRK to allow special inspections of the two
sites so that the initial stocks of nuclear material could be verified. The DPRK refused, and on 12 March announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT (three months notice is required). In April 1993 the IAEA Board concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations
and reported the matter to the UN Security Council. In June 1993 the DPRK announced that it
had "suspended" its withdrawal from the NPT, but subsequently claimed a "special status" with respect to its safeguards
obligations. This was rejected by IAEA.
Once the DPRK's non-compliance had been reported to the UN Security Council, the essential part of the IAEA's mission had been
completed. Inspections in the DPRK continued, although inspectors were increasingly hampered in what they were permitted to do by
the DPRK's claim of a "special status". However, some 8,000 corroding fuel rods associated with the experimental reactor have
remained under close surveillance.
Following bilateral negotiations between DPRK and the USA, and the conclusion of the agreed framework in October 1994, the IAEA has been given additional responsibilities. The agreement requires a freeze on the
operation and construction of the DPRK's plutonium production reactors and their related facilities, and the IAEA is responsible
for monitoring the freeze until the facilities are eventually dismantled. The DPRK remains uncooperative with the IAEA
verification work and has yet to comply with its safeguards agreement.
While Iraq was defeated in a war, allowing the UN the opportunity to seek out and destroy its nuclear weapons programme as
part of the cease-fire conditions, the DPRK was not defeated, nor was it vulnerable to other measures, such as trade sanctions. It can scarcely
afford to import anything, and sanctions on vital commodities, such as oil, would either be ineffective, or risk provoking
war.
Ultimately, the DPRK was persuaded to stop what appeared to be its nuclear weapons programme in exchange, under the agreed
framework, for about US$5 billion in energy-related assistance. This included two 1000 MWe light water nuclear power reactors
based on an advanced US System-80 design.
In 1991, South Africa acceded to the NPT, concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement
with the IAEA, and submitted a report on its nuclear material subject to safeguards. At the time, the state had a nuclear power
programme producing nearly 10% of the country's electricity, whereas Iraq and North Korea only had research reactors.
The IAEA's initial verification task was complicated by South Africa's announcement that between 1979 and 1989 it built and then dismantled a number of nuclear weapons. South
Africa asked the IAEA to verify the conclusion of its weapons programme. In 1995 the IAEA
declared that it was satisfied all materials were accounted for and the weapons programme had been terminated and dismantled.
Threshold States
India and Pakistan (with Israel) have been "threshold" countries in terms of the international non-proliferation regime.
They possess or are quickly capable of assembling one or more nuclear weapons. They have remained outside the 1970 NPT. They are
thus largely excluded from trade in nuclear plant or materials, except for safety-related devices for a few safeguarded
facilities.
In May 1998 India and Pakistan each exploded several nuclear devices underground. This
heightened concerns regarding an arms race between them, with Pakistan involving
the People's Republic of China, an
acknowledged nuclear weapons state. Both countries are opposed to the NPT as it stands, and India has consistently attacked the Treaty since its inception in 1970.
Relations between the two countries are tense and hostile, and the risks of nuclear conflict between them have long been
considered quite high. Kashmir is a prime cause of bilateral tension, its sovereignty
being in dispute since 1948. There is persistent low level military conflict due to
Pakistan backing a Muslim rebellion there.
Both engaged in a conventional arms race in the 1980s, including sophisticated
technology and equipment capable of delivering nuclear weapons. In the 1990s the arms
race quickened. In 1994 India reversed a four-year trend of reduced allocations for
defence, and despite its much smaller economy, Pakistan was expected to push its own expenditures yet higher. Both have lost
their patrons: India, the former USSR, and Pakistan, the United States.
But it is the growth and modernisation of China's nuclear arsenal and its assistance with Pakistan's nuclear power programme
and, reportedly, with missile technology, which exacerbate Indian concerns. In particular, Pakistan is aided by China's People's Liberation Army, which operates somewhat
autonomously within that country as an exporter of military material.
Nuclear power for civil use is well established in India. Its civil nuclear strategy has been directed towards complete
independence in the nuclear fuel cycle, necessary because of its outspoken rejection of the NPT. This self-sufficiency extends
from uranium exploration and mining through fuel fabrication, heavy water production, reactor design and construction, to
reprocessing and waste management. It has a small fast breeder
reactor and is planning a much larger one. It is also developing technology to utilise its abundant resources of thorium as a
nuclear fuel.
India has 14 small nuclear power reactors in commercial operation, two larger ones under construction, and ten more planned.
The 14 operating ones (2548 MWe total) comprise:
- two 150 MWe BWRs from USA, which started up in 1969, now use locally-enriched uranium and are under safeguards,
- two small Canadian PHWRs (1972 & 1980), also under safeguards, and
- ten local PHWRs based on Canadian designs, two of 150 and eight 200 MWe.
The two under construction and two of the planned ones are 450 MWe versions of these 200 MWe domestic products. Construction
has been seriously delayed by financial and technical problems. In 2001 a final agreement was signed with Russia for the
country's first large nuclear power plant, comprising two VVER-1000 reactors, under a Russian-financed US$3 billion contract. The
first unit is due to be commissioned in 2007. A further two Russian units are under consideration for the site.
Nuclear power supplied 3.1% of India's electricity in 2000 and this is expected to reach 10% by 2005. Its industry is largely
without IAEA safeguards, though a few plants (see above) are under facility-specific safeguards. As a result India's nuclear
power programme proceeds largely without fuel or technological assistance from other countries. Its power reactors have been
among the worst-performing in the world, reflecting the technical difficulties of the country's isolation, but are apparently now
improving significantly.
Its weapons material appears to come from a Canadian-designed 40MW "research" reactor which started up in 1960, well before
the NPT, and a 100MW indigenous unit in operation since 1985. Both use local uranium, as India does not import any nuclear fuel.
It is estimated that India may have built up enough weapons-grade plutonium for a hundred nuclear warheads.
The country has at least three other research reactors including the tiny one which is exploring the use of thorium as a
nuclear fuel, by breeding fissile U-233. In addition, an advanced heavy-water thorium cycle is under development.
India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, the so-called Smiling
Buddha test, which it has consistently claimed was for peaceful purposes. Others saw it as a response to China's nuclear
weapons capability. It was then universally perceived, notwithstanding official denials, to possess, or to be able to quickly
assemble, nuclear weapons. In 1997 it deployed its own medium-range missile and is now developing a long-range missile capable of
reaching targets in China's industrial heartland.
In 1995 the USA quietly intervened to head off a proposed nuclear test. The latest tests
are unambiguously military, including one claimed to be of a sophisticated thermonuclear device, and their declared purpose is
"to help in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields and different delivery systems".
Indian security policies are driven by:
- its determination to be recognised as the dominant power in the region;
- its increasing concern with China's expanding nuclear weapons and missile delivery programmes; and
- its obsession with Pakistan, with its presumed nuclear weapons capability and now the clear capability to deliver such
weapons deep into India.
It perceives nuclear weapons as a cost-effective political counter to China's nuclear and conventional weaponry, and the
effects of its nuclear weapons policy in provoking Pakistan is, by some accounts, considered incidental. India has had an unhappy
relationship with China. Soundly defeated by China in the 1962 war, relations were frozen
until 1998. Since then a degree of high-level contact has been established and a few
elementary confidence-building measures put in place. China still occupies some Indian territory. Its nuclear weapon and missile
support for Pakistan is a major bone of contention.
In Pakistan, nuclear power supplies only 1.7% of the country's electricity. It has one small (125 MWe) Canadian PHWR nuclear
power reactor from 1971 which is under international safeguards, and a 300 MWe PWR supplied
by China under safeguards, which started up in May 2000. A third one, a Chinese PWR, is planned. Enriched fuel for the PWRs will
be imported from China.
It also has a 9 MW research reactor of 1965 vintage, and there are persistent reports of
another "multipurpose" reactor, a 50 MW PHWR near Khushab, which is presumed to have potential for producing weapons plutonium.
Pakistan's concentration is on weapons technology, particularly the production of highly enriched uranium suitable for nuclear
weapons, utilising indigenous uranium. It has at least one small centrifuge enrichment plant. In 1990 the US Administration cut off aid because it was unable to certify that Pakistan was not pursuing a policy of
manufacturing nuclear weapons. This was relaxed late in 2001. In 1996 USA froze export loans to China because it was allegedly supplying centrifuge enrichment technology to
Pakistan. Indian opinion is in no doubt about Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability.
Pakistan has made it clear since early 1996 that it had done the basic development work, and that if India staged a nuclear
test, Pakistan would immediately start assembling its own nuclear explosive device. It is assumed to now have enough
highly-enriched uranium for up to forty nuclear warheads.
In April 1998 Pakistan test fired a long-range missile capable of reaching Madras in southern India, pushing home the point by naming it after a 12th century Muslim conqueror. This development removed India's main military
advantage over Pakistan.
Pakistan's security concerns derive from India's possession of a nuclear weapons capability, its development of short and
intermediate-range missiles and, since their partition in 1947, its defeat by India in two of three wars, notably in East Bengal,
now Bangladesh.
In May 1998 Pakistan announced that they had conducted six underground tests in the Chagai Hills, five on the 28th and one on
the 30th of that month. Seismic events consistent with these claims were recorded.
Pakistan-North Korea Nuclear and Missile Cooperation
Pakistan and North Korea's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons have had some similarities. Both countries first attempted the
plutonium route to acquire such weapons and when this was thwarted turned towards uranium enrichment.
Pakistan
In 1970s it first focused on the plutonium route with the fissile material expected to come from diversion from a reprocessing
plant to be sourced from France. However under the US pressure this attempt could not take off. Thereafter Pakistan redoubled its
efforts to obtain uranium enrichment technology. The main efforts towards this direction were done under Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, who had earlier worked with Fyssich Dynamisch
Oderzoekslaboratorium (FDO), a subsidiary of the Dutch firm VMF-Stork based in Amsterdam. From 1972-1975 he had access to
classified data used to enrich ordinary uranium to weapons grade concentrations. FDO was working on the development of ultra
high-speed centrifuges for Urenco. In 1974 while he was on secondment for 16 days as a translator to the Urenco plant in Almelo,
he obtained photographs and documents of the plant. Dr. A. Q. Khan returned to Pakistan in 1976 and initiated the Uranium
enrichment programme on the basis of the technology he had stolen from his previous employer. In this programme, Pakistan
received significant help from China.
His efforts made Dr. Khan into a national hero. In 1981, as a tribute, the president of Pakistan, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, renamed the enrichment plant the A. Q. Khan
Research Laboratories.
In 2003, Dr. Khan became the subject of an investigation by the government of Pakistan
into nuclear proliferation from Pakistan to other countries.
North Korea
North Korea joined the NPT in 1985 and had subsequently signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. However it was believed
that North Korea was diverting plutonium extracted from the fuel of its reactor at Yongbyon, for use in nuclear weapons. The
subsequent confrontation with IAEA on the issue of inspections and suspected violations, resulted in North Korea threatening to
withdraw from the NPT in 1993. This led to negotiations with the US resulting in the Agreed Framework of 1994, which provided for
IAEA safeguards being applied to its reactors and spent fuel rods. These spent fuel rods were sealed in canisters by US to
prevent North Korea from extracting plutonium from them. North Korea had to therefore freeze its plutonium programme.
During this period Pakistan-North Korea cooperation in missile technology transfer was being established. A high level
Pakistani military delegation visited North Korea in August-September 1992, reportedly to discuss the supply Scud missile
technology to Pakistan. In 1993, PM Benazir Bhutto travelled to China
and North Korea. The visits are believed to be related to the subsequent acquisition of Ghauri (North Korean No-dong) missiles by
Pakistan. During the period 1992-1994, A.Q. Khan was reported to have visited North Korea thirteen times. The missile cooperation
programme with North Korea was under Dr. A. Q. Khan's Kahuta Research Laboratories. At this time China was under US pressure not
to supply the M series of missiles to Pakistan. This forced the latter (possibly with Chinese connivance) to approach North Korea
for missile transfers. Reports indicate that North Korea was willing to supply missile sub-systems including rocket motors,
inertial guidance systems, control and testing equipment of Scud SSMs for US$ 50
million.
It is not clear what North Korea got in return. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. in Jane's Defence Weekly
(27 November 2002) reports that Western analysts had begun to question what
North Korea received in payment for the missiles; many suspected it was nuclear technology and components. Khan's KRL was in
charge of both Pakistan's uranium enrichment programme and also of the missile programme with North Korea. It is therefore likely
during this period that cooperation in nuclear technology between Pakistan and North Korea was initiated. Western intelligence
agencies began to notice exchange of personnel, technology and components between KRL and entities of the North Korean 2nd
Economic Committee (responsible for weapons production).
A New York Times report on October 18, 2002 quoted US intelligence officials having stated that Pakistan was a major supplier of critical
equipment to North Korea. The report added that equipment such as gas centrifuges appeared to have been "part of a barter deal"
in which North Korea supplied Pakistan with missiles. Separate reports indicate (Washington Times, November 22, 2002) that U.S.
intelligence had as early as 1999 picked up signs that North Korea was continuing to develop nuclear arms. Other reports also
indicate that North Korea had been working covertly to develop an enrichment capability for nuclear weapons for at least five
years and had used technology obtained from Pakistan (Washington Times, October
18, 2002).
Nuclear arms control in the region
The public stance of the two states on non-proliferation differs markedly. Pakistan appears to have dominated a continuing
propaganda debate.
Pakistan has initiated a series of regional security proposals. It has repeatedly proposed a nuclear free zone in South Asia
and has proclaimed its willingness to engage in nuclear disarmament and to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty if India would do
so. It has endorsed a United States proposal for a regional five power conference to consider non-proliferation in South
Asia.
India has taken the view that solutions to regional security issues should be found at the international rather than the
regional level, since its chief concern is with China. It therefore rejects Pakistan's proposals.
Instead, the 'Gandhi Plan', put
forward in 1988, proposed the revision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it regards
correctly as inherently discriminatory in favour of the nuclear-weapon States, and a timetable for complete nuclear weapons
disarmament. It endorsed early proposals for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and for an international convention to ban the
production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes, known as the 'cut-off' convention.
The United States for some years, especially under the Clinton
administration, pursued a variety of initiatives to persuade India and Pakistan to abandon their nuclear weapons programmes and
to accept comprehensive international safeguards on all their nuclear activities. To this end the Clinton administration proposed
a conference of the five nuclear-weapon states, Japan, Germany, India and Pakistan.
India refused this and similar previous proposals, and countered with demands that other potential weapons states, such as
Iran and North Korea, should be invited, and that regional limitations would only be acceptable if they were accepted equally by
China. The USA would not accept the participation of Iran and North Korea and these initiatives have lapsed.
Another, more recent approach, centres on 'capping' the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, which would
hopefully be followed by 'roll back'. To this end India and the United States jointly sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution
in 1993 calling for negotiations for a 'cut-off' convention. Should India and Pakistan join such a convention, they would have to
agree to halt the production of fissile materials for weapons and to accept international verification on their relevant nuclear
facilities (enrichment and reprocessing plants). It appears that India is now prepared to join negotiations regarding such a
Cut-off Treaty, under the UN Conference on Disarmament.
Bilateral confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan to reduce the prospects of confrontation have been limited.
In 1990 each side ratified a treaty not to attack the other's nuclear installations, and at the end of 1991 they provided one
another with a list showing the location of all their nuclear plants, even though the respective lists were regarded as not being
wholly accurate. Early in 1994 India proposed a bilateral agreement for a 'no first use' of nuclear weapons and an extension of
the 'no attack' treaty to cover civilian and industrial targets as well as nuclear installations.
Having promoted the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty since 1954, India dropped its support in 1995 and in 1996 attempted to block the Treaty. Following the 1998 tests the
question has been reopened and both Pakistan and India have indicated their intention to sign the CTBT. Indian ratification may
be conditional upon the five weapons states agreeing to specific reductions in nuclear arsenals. The UN Conference on Disarmament
has also called upon both countries "to accede without delay to the Non-Proliferation Treaty", presumably as non-weapons
states.
Both India and Pakistan will have noted that the agreement between the United States and North Korea over the future of its
nuclear programme shows that would-be nuclear weapons states can be handsomely rewarded for nuclear intransigence. It is clear
that some political figures in India and Pakistan see the North Korean Agreement as an exercise in successful blackmail against
western powers.
Israel is also thought to possess an arsenal of potentially up to several hundred nuclear warheads and associated delivery systems, but this has never been openly confirmed or denied.
An Israeli nuclear installation is located about ten kilometers to the south of Dimona, the Negev Nuclear Research Center. Its construction commmenced in 1958, with French assistance. The official reason given by the Israeli and
French governments was to build a nuclear reactor to power a "desalination plant", in order to "green the Negev". The purpose of
Dimona is widely assumed to be the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, and the majority of defence experts have concluded that it
does in fact do that. However, the Israeli government refuses to confirm or deny this publicly, a policy it refers to as
"ambiguity".
When the United States intelligence community discovered the purpose
of Dimona in the early 1960s, it demanded that Israel agree to international inspections. Israel agreed, but on a condition that
US, rather than IAEA, inspectors were used, and that Israel would receive advanced notice of all inspections.
Some claim that because Israel knew the schedule of the inspectors' visits, it was able to hide the alleged purpose of the
site from the inspectors by installing temporary false walls and other devices before each inspection. The inspectors eventually
informed the U.S. government that their inspections were useless due to Israeli restrictions on what areas of the facility they
could inspect. In 1969, the United States terminated the inspections.
In 1986, Mordechai Vanunu,
a former technican at Dimona, revealed to the media some evidence of Israel's nuclear programme. Israeli agents kidnapped him
from Italy, drugged him and transported him to Israel, and an Israeli court then tried him in secret on charges of treason and espionage, and sentenced him to
eighteen years imprisonment. He was freed on April 21st, 2004, but was severely limited by the Israeli government.
See also: nuclear disarmament, nuclear weapon, nuclear
reactor, nuclear warfare, United Nations, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
External links and references
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