Mutual assured destruction |
Mutual assured destruction (MAD) is the doctrine of military
strategy in which a full scale use of nuclear weapons by one of two opposing sides would result in the destruction of both the attacker and the
defender. The doctrine assumes that each side has enough weaponry to destroy the other side and that either side, if attacked for
any reason by the other, would retaliate with equal or greater force. The expected result is an immediate escalation resulting in
both combatants total and assured destruction. Generally, it
is assumed that the nuclear fallout or nuclear winter would bring about world devastation.
Theory
Assuming that neither side would be so irrational as to risk its own destruction, neither side would dare to launch a first strike as the other would launch on warning (also called fail deadly). The payoff of this doctrine was expected to be tense but stable
peace.
The primary application of this doctrine occurred during the Cold War (1950s to 1990s) between the United States and Soviet Union, in which MAD was
seen as helping to prevent any direct full-scale conflicts between the two nations while they engaged in smaller proxy wars
around the world.
MAD was part of U.S. strategic doctrine that believed nuclear war between
the Soviet Union and the United States could best be prevented if neither side could expect to survive a full scale nuclear
exchange. As a result, neither side could be expected to adquately defend itself against the other's nuclear missiles (see
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty). The
credibility of the threat being critical to such assurance, each side had to invest substantial capital in weapons, even those not intended for use.
This MAD scenario was often known by the euphemism "nuclear deterrence." (The
term 'deterrence' was first used in this context after World War II; the previous definition of the word was limited to its use
in the juridical terminology.)
The key component to MAD is the survivability of enough nuclear forces after an initial strike to ensure a completely
destructive nuclear response. For this to occur, an overwhelming number of nuclear weapons were constructed, nuclear missile
bunkers were hardened, and nuclear bombers
kept at failsafe points. The most
important part of this though was the submarine.
A ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) is a submarine armed with multiple (up to twenty-four) MIRV tipped missiles. Being a submarine, it depended on stealth for survival. Enough ballistic missile submarines were
fielded by both Cold War adversaries that was assumed several would be able to hide long enough, in the event of a first attack,
to respond with enough nuclear weapons to destroy most of the civilian population of the attacking country. Note that ballistic
missile submarines are currently mainly fielded by the United States and Russia, though France, the United Kingdom and China all maintain SSBNs, with France being the only nation currently constructing them.
Criticism
Critics of the MAD doctrine noted that the acronym MAD fits the word mad (meaning insane) because it depended on several challengable assumptions:
- Perfect detection
- No false positives in the equipment and/or procedures that must identify a launch by the other side
- No possibility of camouflaging a launch
- No alternate means of delivery other than a missile (no hiding warheads in an ice cream truck)
- The weaker version of MAD also depends on perfect attribution of the launch. (If you see a launch on the Sino-Russian border,
who do you retaliate against?) The stronger version of MAD does not depend on attribution. (If someone launches at you, end the
world.)
- Perfect rationality
- No rogue states will develop nuclear weapons (or, if they do, they will stop behaving as rogue states and start to subject
themselves to the logic of MAD)
- No rogue commanders will have the ability to corrupt the launch decision process
- All leaders with launch capability care about the survival of their subjects
- No leader with launch capability would strike first and gamble that the opponent's response system would fail
- Inability to defend
- No shelters sufficient to protect population and/or industry
- No development of anti-missile technology or deployment of remedial protective gear
History
Cold War
The United States began the Cold War by ending World War II with the
nuclear attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. On August
9, 1949, the Soviet Union
developed its own nuclear weapons. Both sides lacked the means to effectively use the nuclear devices against each other.
However, with the development of aircraft like the B-36 Peacemaker,
both sides were gaining more ability to deliver nuclear weapons effectively.
It was only with the advent of ballistic missile submarines, starting with the George Washington class submarine in
1959, that a survivable nuclear force became anticipatable, or even expected. (Note that
this was not immediately understood at the time.) With the inability of one side to destroy the other before an overwhelming
second strike, nuclear war between the two sides became less likely, due to the now developed theory of MAD.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union truly
developed an understanding of the effectiveness of the US ballistic missile submarine forces and work on Soviet ballistic missile
submarines began in earnest. For the remainder of the Cold War, although official positions on MAD changed in the United States,
the consequences of the second strike from ballistic missile submarines was never in doubt.
American policy was always of a "winnable" nuclear war. In the event of a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe, NATO
planned to use tactical nuclear weapons. However, the Soviet Union countered this threat by issuing a statement that any use of
nuclear weapons against Soviet forces, conventional or otherwise, was grounds for a fullscale Soviet retalitory strike. In
effect, if the Soviet Union invaded Europe, the United States would stop the offensive with tactical nuclear weapons. Then, the
Soviet Union would respond with a full scale nuclear strike on the United States. The United States would respond with a full
scale nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. As such, it was generally understood that any combat in Europe would end with apocalyptic conclusions.
It has been argued that MAD was abandoned on 25 July 1980 when US President Jimmy Carter adopted the
countervailing strategy in Presidential Directive 59. From this date onwards US policy was to win a nuclear war. The
planned response to a Soviet attack was no longer to bomb Russian cities and assure their destruction. American nuclear weapons
were first to kill the Soviet leadership, then attack military targets, in the hope of a Russian surrender before total
destruction of the USSR (and the USA). This policy was further developed by Reagan Administration with the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (aka Star Wars), aimed at destroying Russian missiles before they
reached the US. If SDI had been operational and effective, it would have undermined the "assured destruction" required for
MAD.
Post Cold War
The fall of the Soviet Union has reduced tensions between Russia and the
United States and between the United States and China. Although the administration of George W. Bush has abrogated the anti-ballistic missile treaty, the limited national missile defense system proposed by the
Bush administration is designed to prevent nuclear blackmail by a
state with limited nuclear capability and is not planned to alter the nuclear posture between Russia and the United States.
Russia and the United States still tacitly hold to the principles of MAD.
The George W. Bush administration approached Russia with the idea of moving away from MAD to a different nuclear policy of
total weaponry escalation. Russia has thus far been rather unreceptive to these approaches largely out of fear that a different
defense posture would be more advantageous to the United States than to Russia.
See also
External link
|