Battle of Tsushima

The Battle of Tsushima (in Japan, it is called the "Sea of Japan naval battle") was the decisive sea battle of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. It was fought on May 27-May 28, 1905 (May 14-15 by old Julian calendar, used in Russia before the Russian Revolution). In this battle the Japanese fleet under Admiral Heihachiro Togo destroyed 2/3 of the Russian fleet under Admiral Zinovi Petrovich Rozhdestvenski.

Overview

The Japanese combined fleet and the Russian Baltic Fleet, sent over from Europe, fought in the straits between Korea and Japan near the island of Tsushima. Earlier, the Russian Pacific Fleet had been destroyed at the Battle of Shantung on August 10, 1904. The Baltic Fleet sailed through the North Sea, caused a diplomatic incident off Dogger Bank when they attacked the British fishing fleet there, and then proceeded around Africa and touched port in Indochina. The voyage was long and the crews grew less efficient and discontented. The Russians were ordered to break the blockade of Port Arthur (Lushun), but the city had already fallen before the arrival of the ships and so they tried to reach Vladivostok.

The Russians could have sailed through one of three possible straits to reach Vladivostok: La Perouse, Tsugaru, and Tsushima. Admiral Rozhedestvensky chose Tsushima in an effort to simplify his route. Admiral Togo, based at Pusan, Korea also believed Tsushima would be the preferred Russian course.

The Russian fleet was sighted when two trailing hospital ships were discovered by the Japanese cruiser fleet. The Russians sailed from south-south-west to north-north-east; the Japanese fleet from west-north-east. Admiral Togo ordered the fleet to turn in sequence (see Naval tactics at the Battle of Tsushima), which enabled his ships to take the same course as the Russians, though risking each battleship in turn. This "U" turn was successful.

The two lines of battleships stabilized their distance at 6,200 meters and exchanged gunfire. The Japanese fleets had practiced gunnery continually since the beginning of the war, using sub caliber adaptors for their cannon. The Japanese had superior gunners, and hit their targets more often. Furthermore, the Japanese used a different combination of gunpowder, called "shimose", which was designed to explode on contact and wreck the upper works of ships. The Russians used armor-piercing rounds. Japanese hits caused more damage to Russian ships in proportion to Russian hits on Japanese ships.

Owing to the long approach route of the Russian fleet through tropical waters and the lack of opportunity for maintenance, the bottoms of their warships were heavily fouled with marine growth, significantly reducing their speed relative to the Japanese. In naval battle maneuvers, speed can offer a significant advantage when combined with long range gunnery. The Japanese ships could reach 16 knots (30 km/h), but the Russians fleet could reach only 8 knots (15 km/h). Togo was able to use this advantage to "cross the T" twice.

Admiral Rozhdestvenski was knocked out of action with a shell fragment in his skull. The Russians fleet lost the Suvarov, the Oslyabya, the Alexander III, and the Borodino on May 27. Five other battleships under Admiral Nebagatov were forced to surrender the next day. Three cruisers made it to the United States naval base at Manila and were interned.

Nearly the entire Baltic fleet was lost in the battle in the Tsushima Straits.

Naval Tactics

Battleships, cruisers, and other vessels were arranged into divisions, each division being commanded by a Flag officer (i.e. Admiral). At the battle of Tsushima Admiral Togo was the officer commanding in the battleship Mikasa (the other divisions being commanded by Vice Admirals, Rear Admirals, Commodores and Captains and Commanders for the destroyer divisions). Next in line after Mikasa came the battleship Shikishima, followed by the battleships; Fuji and Asahi. Following the battleships were three cruisers. Each ship had an allotted place in the "battleline", each ship following the one in front. When Admiral Togo decided to execute a turn to port "in sequence" he did so in order to preserve the sequence of his battleline, i.e. with the flagship Mikasa still in the lead (obviously Togo wanted his more powerful units to enter action first). Turning in sequence meant that each ship would turn one after the other whilst still following the ship in front, effectively each ship would turn over the same piece of sea (this being the danger in the manoeuvre as it gives the enemy fleet the opportunity to target that area). Togo could have ordered his ships to turn "together" i.e. each ship would have made the turn at the same time and reversed course, this manoeuvre would be quicker but would have disrupted the sequence of the battleline and placed the cruisers in the lead and this was something Togo wanted to avoid.

See also

• Russo-Japanese war
• Military history
• List of battles
• History of Japan
• History of Russia

External links

• Russojapanesewar.com — Contains a complete order of battle of both fleets. It also contains Admiral Togo's post-battle report and the account of Russian ensign Sememov.

Further reading

• Busch, Noel F. The Emperor's Sword: Japan vs. Russia in the Battle of Tsushima. New York: Funk & Wagnall’s, 1969.
• Hailey, Foster and Milton Lancelot. Clear for Action: The Photographic Story of Modern Naval Combat, 1898-1964. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pierce, 1964.
• Woodward, David. The Russians at Sea: A History of the Russian Navy. New York: Praeger Publishers. 1966.
• Hough, Richard Alexander. The fleet that had to die. New York: Ballentine Paperbacks. 1960.